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Abstract
Consider exchange economies in which preferences are continuous,
convex and strongly monotonic. It is well known that the Walrasian
correspondence is not Nash implementable. Maskin monotonicity
(Maskin, 1999) is violated for allocations at the boundary of the fea-
sible set. We derive an impossibility result showing that it is in fact
not implementable in any solution concept.
Next, we construct a sequential mechanism based on price-allocation
announcements that ts the very description of Walrasian Equilib-
rium. Imposing an additional domain restriction, we show that it
fully implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect
and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. We thus take care of the
boundary problem that was prominent in the Nash implementation
literature.
Keywords: Walrasian equilibrium, preference reversal, double implemen-
tation, subgame perfect equilibrium, strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
The question of the decentralization of the Walrasian correspondence has re-
ceived much attention over the past two decades. Hurwicz (1972) rst showed
that it is not strategy-proof, thereby underlining that dominant strategies is
not the right solution concept to use for its implementation. On the other
hand, it is well-known (see e.g. Hurwicz-Maskin-Postlewaite (1995)) that it
is not Nash implementable either. Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1977 and
1999) is violated for allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set.
In this paper, we raise again the question of the implementability of the
Walrasian correspondence. We know that the class of implementable social
choice correspondences (henceforth SCCs) rapidly expands when one con-
siders renements of Nash equilibrium as solution concepts. In their semi-
nal papers, Moore-Repullo (1988) (MR in the sequel) and Abreu-Sen (1990)
(henceforth AS) show that Maskin monotonicity is no longer necessary for
implementation in subgame perfect equilibrium. In MR, it is shown that the
Walrasian Correspondence is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium
when preferences are continuous, convex and monotonic. In contradiction
with their claim, we rst show that, without further restrictions, the Wal-
rasian correspondence dened over this class of economies is in fact not im-
plementable in any solution concept. Indeed, the Walrasian correspondence
is a function of preferences not only inside but also outside of the feasible
set. Unless one imposes further domain restrictions, implementation of the
Walrasian correspondence is not possible.
After observing that thanks to di¤erentiability, the Walrasian correspon-
dence is implementable in subgame perfect equilibrium, we then proceed to
solve the boundary problem in a satisfactory way.12
Hurwicz (1979) and Schmeidler (1980) have constructed mechanisms that
Nash implement the Walrasian correspondence but in which o¤ equilibrium
allocations may award negative quantities to some agents. Postlewaite-
Wettstein (1989), Giraud-Rochon (2001), Dutta-Sen-Vohra (1995), Tian (1992,
2000) or Sotskov (2003) among others, construct mechanisms that imple-
1When di¤erentiability is added, the Walrasian correspondence satises unchanged con-
tour independence, a su¢ cient condition for subgame perfect implementation (see Mani-
quet, 2002).
2Obviously, even with di¤erentiability, the Walrasian correspondence is not Nash im-
plementable as long as corner allocations are not excluded.
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ments the ConstrainedWalrasian correspondence.3 Papers on non-cooperative
bargaining such as Gale (1986, a and b), or more recently Kunimoto-Serrano
(2004) provide full implementation of theWalrasian correspondence for economies
with a continuum of agents. However, Walrasian allocations at the bound-
ary of the feasible sets are ruled out. Yildiz (2002) covers the two players
case, and use assumptions such as uniqueness and interiority of Walrasian
allocations.
Therefore, none of the papers cited above take care of the boundary
problem. On the other hand, the canonical mechanism constructed in MR
and AS would indeed implement the Walrasian correspondence. However,
as any general mechanism, it fundamentally lacks economic interpretation.
Besides, their game form is complicated and has innite message spaces.
It involves each agent reporting the entire preferences prole.4 Parallel to
the literature on Nash implementation, we believe that the design of tailor-
made sequential mechanisms is more appealing. Our aim is to provide an
alternative mechanism that is based on the Walrasian notion of allocation
and prices and that ts the very description of Walrasian equilibrium.
The important point is that our construction takes care, for the rst time,
of the boundary problem that was prominent in the Nash implementation
literature. Moreover, our mechanism doubly implements the Walrasian cor-
respondence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up of the
paper. Section 3 deals with our impossibility result. In section 4, we present
the mechanism and the implementation result. Finally, we provide some nal
comments in section 5.
2 The set-up
2.1 Economic environments
There are L innitely divisible goods and a set of agents N = f1; : : : ; ng,
with n  2. The consumption set of each agent i 2 N is RL+. For each agent
i 2 N , Ri is the complete and transitive binary relation on RL+ indicating
3For domains in which Walrasian allocations are interior, the constrained Walrasian
and the Walrasian correspondences coincide.
4That is, each agent reports his own preferences, as well as the preferences of all the
other agents in the economy.
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(weak) preferences. The associated strict preference and indi¤erence relations
are denoted by Pi and Ii, respectively. The set of possible preferences of each
agent i 2 N is dened by Ri. Denote by R =
Q
iRi the set of possible
preference proles. A typical preference prole is R = (Ri)i2N 2 R. Each
agent i 2 N is also characterized by his individual endowment !i > 0. The
aggregate endowment is !  0.5
The only characteristics that vary and that are unknown to the planner
are the preferences of agents. An economy is thus a list of preference relation,
one for each agent. Formally, an economy is R = (Ri)i2N 2 R. We consider
the following two classes of exchange economies.
RND: for each agent i 2 N , every Ri 2 RNDi is continuous, convex and
strongly monotonic.6
RD: for each agent i 2 N , every Ri 2 RDi is continuous, convex, strongly
monotonic and representable by a di¤erentiable utility function.
A (feasible) allocation is a list of bundle (xi)i2N 2 RLn+ such that
P
xi 
!. Given an agent i 2 N , we let xi;l 2 R+ stand for the quantity of good l
received by agent i at bundle xi.
The set of feasible allocations A is,
A = fx 2 RLn+ :
X
xi  !g:
Let Ai be the projection of A onto agent is consumption space.
Dene by F the set of balanced allocations,
F = fx 2 RLn+ :
X
xi = !g:
Dene by P = RL++ the set of strictly positive price vectors.
For each agent i 2 N; denote by Bi(p; zi) and Bi(p; zi)jxi!, the budget
set and the constrained budget set, respectively, of agent i at a given price p
and bundle zi 2 RL+. More formally,
Bi(p; zi) =

xi 2 RL+ j p  xi  p  zi
	
Bi(p; zi)jxi! = fxi 2 Ai j p  xi  p  zig :
5We order vectors with the usual conventions, , >, .
6A preference relation Ri dened over RL+ is convex if, for every xi and yi 2 RL+ such
that xi Pi yi, we have that xi + (1  )yi Pi yi for every  2 (0; 1].
A preference Ri dened over RL+ is strongly monotonic if, for each xi and yi 2 RL+,
xi > yi implies that xi Pi yi.
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Given an agent i 2 N , a preference Ri 2 Ri and a bundle xi 2 Xi,
dene by UCi(xi; Ri) =

yi 2 RL+ : yi Ri xi
	
the upper contour set at xi;
LCi(xi; Ri) =

yi 2 RL+ : xi Ri yi
	
, the lower contour set at xi; SUCi(xi; Ri) =
yi 2 RL+ : yi Pi xi
	
, the strict upper contour set at xi; ICi(xi; Ri) =

yi 2 RL+ : xi Ii yi
	
,
the indi¤erence curve through xi.
Finally, given a domain R and R = (Ri)i2N 2 R, an allocation x 2 A
is a Walrasian allocation if there exists p 6= 0, such that for each i 2 N ,
xi 2 Bi(p; !i) and xi Ri yi, for every yi 2 Bi(p; !i).7
The Walrasian correspondence WE : R A associates to each economy
R = (Ri)i2N 2 R its set of Walrasian allocations WE(R).
To conclude, we recall the denition of Maskin monotonicity, the neces-
sary condition C for subgame perfect implementation introduced in MR, as
well as a su¢ cient condition introduced in Maniquet (2002).
Maskin monotonicity: A SCC f satises Maskin monotonicity if and
only if for each (R; R0) 2 R2 and each a 2 f(R),
[LCi (ai; Ri) \ Ai  LCi(ai; R0i) \ Ai for each i 2 N ] =) [a 2 f(R0)]
Condition C: A SCC f satises condition C if and only if for each (R;
R0) 2 R2 and each a 2 f(R)nf(R0), there exists a nite sequence of feasible
allocations fa0 = a; a1; :::; ak; ak+1g such that the following is true:
a) For each l = 0; :::; k   1, there exists an agent jl for whom
al;jl Rjl al+1;jl.
b) There is some particular agent jk, with Rjk 6= R0jk , for whom
ak;jk Rjk ak+1;jk and ak+1;jk P
0
jk
ak;jk .
Unchanged contour independence: A SCC f satises unchanged con-
tour independence if and only if for each (R; R0) 2 R2 and each a 2 f(R),
[ICi(ai; Ri) \ Ai = ICi(ai; R0i) \ Ai for each i 2 N ] =) [a 2 f(R0)]
7Notice that, both in RND and RD, preferences are strongly montonic. It implies that
at a Walrasian equilibrium (x; p), the price vector p is such that p 0.
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2.2 Game-form: denitions and notations
An extensive game form or mechanism is a game tree with possibly simul-
taneous moves. More formally, it is dened as an array   = (N; T; g) where
N is the set of players, T a game tree, and g is an outcome function that
associates a feasible allocation with each path of play. The set of nodes of
the tree T is denoted S. The initial node is s0. The set of terminal nodes
of the tree T is denoted Z. Let Mi be the set of strategies of player i, and
let M si denote the set of strategies available to player i at node s. Denote
by M =
Q
iMi, the set of strategy proles. Suppose the strategy prole
m 2M is played. Let g(m)i stand for bundle obtained by agent i 2 N at the
allocation prescribed by the path induced by m, that is, g(m). Let g(m; s)
denotes the outcome corresponding to m starting at node s. As is common
in the implementation literature, we conne our attention to pure strategies.
Given an economy R = (Ri)i2N 2 R, the mechanism   denes a non-
cooperative game in extensive game form ( ; R). A subgame perfect equilib-
rium of ( ; R) is a strategy prole m 2M such that for all s 2 SnZ and for
all i 2 N ,
g(m; s)i Ri g(mi;m i; s)
i for each mi 2Mi.
For each R 2 R, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of
( ; R) is denoted SPE( ; R).
A strong Nash equilibrium of ( ; R) is a strategy prole m 2 M such
that no coalition of agents have an incentive to deviate simultaneously. That
is, for every m0 2M and coalition S  N , if mi = m0i for each i 2 NnS, then
there is j 2 S such that,
g(m)i Ri g(m0)i.
A strong subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is a strategy prole m
such that for each proper subgame, the prole of strategies is a strong Nash
equilibrium in that subgame. For each R 2 R the set of strong subgame
perfect equilibrium of ( ; R) is denoted SSPE ( ; R).
An extensive game form   is said to doubly implement in subgame perfect
and strong subgame perfect equilibrium the Walrasian correspondence if and
only if
SSPE( ; R) = SPE( ; R) =WE(R) 8R 2 R.
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We dene next the more general notion of implementability.
Implementability: A SCC f satises implementability if and only if
there exist a solution concept S and a mechanism G such that G implements
f via S.
We need to introduce one last piece of notation. For each agent i 2 N ,
select an "i 2 Rl+ such that !i i 2 Rl+nf0g (note that, for each agent i, such
an i exists since we assumed that !i > 0 8i 2 N). Dene by  : N  ! N
the set of one-to-one functions from the set of agents into itself. Let us
dene by f() the composition of the permutations, where  = (i), i 2 
for each i 2 N . Therefore, f() = 1(2(: : : (i : : : (n)) : : :) stands for the
ordered composition of all permutation of . We call f() a (endogenously
determined) protocol. As we shall conne our attention to pure strategies,
notice that any agent i 2 N , by making a unilateral change from i to 0i,
can induce any protocol from the composition. The use of permutations is
in e¤ect quite similar to an integer game. However, unlike integer devices,
the strategy sets are compact.8 In our case, it captures an idea of anonymity
of the mechanism, in the sense that the equilibria should be independent
of protocols. In our framework, ti works as a king-makerprocess since it
determines who will lead the game if it goes beyond the rst stage. A similar
device was used in Serrano-Vohra (1997). Permutations were used rst in a
di¤erent fashion in Thomson (1992, 2004).
3 An impossibility Result
Given any solution concept, implementability of a SCC requires the following
basic property to be satised.
Preference reversal: A SCC f has the preference reversal property if
and only if for each R; R0 2 R and a 2 f(R)nf(R0), there exists an agent
i 2 N and two feasible allocations x, y 2 A such that,
xi Ri yi and yi Pi xi
Such a property is the most basic requirement for a SCC to be im-
plementable in some solution concept. Consider the situation where x 2
8See Jackson (1992) for a criticism of integer game devices.
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f(R)nf(R0) for some R and R0. If f satises implementability, there exists a
solution concept S and a mechanism G that implements f via S. Precisely,
there exist a prole of messages m that is an S-equilibrium and that gives
g(m) = x. Now, if x =2 f(R0) because the only preference reversal that occurs
is outside of the feasible set, then f cannot be in fact implemented via S:
it is not possible to check information on allocations that are not feasible.
Hence, m remains an S-equilibrium of G under R0.
When the preference domain is RND, the Walrasian correspondence vio-
lates preference reversal. The reason stems from the fact that the Walrasian
correspondence is a function of preferences both inside and outside of the
feasible set. Without further restrictions on the environment, the Walrasian
correspondence is not implementable in any solution concept. It is of im-
portance to note that the problem we underline here also pertains to other
competitive concept such as the Lindhal correspondence. It is easy to ex-
tend Proposition 1 below to the Kolm triangle and Lindhal allocations. The
example is available upon request.
Proposition 1: Suppose the domain is RND and n  2. Then the
Walrasian correspondence violates implementability.
Proof: We construct the following example with two agents and two
goods. It is easy to see that it extends to cases with three and more agents.
There are only two preference proles R = (R1; R2) and R0 = (R01; R2). The
preferences are represented by utility functions as follows.
u1(; R1) = min

x1 + y1; x1 +
1
3
y1 +
8
3
	
and u1(; R01) = x1 + y1.
u2() = 2x2 + y2
!1 = !2 = (2; 2).
When the prole is R, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium (z; p) on the
boundary of the feasible set with z = ((1; 4); (3; 0)) and p = (2; 1).
The situation is depicted graphically in gure 1 below.
Since (z; p) is not a Walrasian Equilibrium under R0, implementability
requires preference reversal to be satised. However, there exists no pair of
feasible allocation x and y such that
xi Ri yi and yi P 0i xi for some i.
In conclusion, the Walrasian correspondence is not implementable in any
solution concept.
Q.E.D.
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Considering the domain RD  RND excludes the case of proposition 1
from the domain. As a consequence, the Walrasian correspondence satises
unchanged contour independence, a su¢ cient condition for subgame perfect
implementation.9 Therefore, if we exclude kinked indi¤erence curves, we
do not need further restriction on the environment in order to implement
the Walrasian correspondence in subgame perfect equilibrium. In fact, if
given two economies an allocation is Walrasian at one preference prole R
but not at R0, di¤erentiability guarantees that local information around that
allocation can be used to construct a (feasible) sequence of outcomes as
required by condition C. This can be seen in gure 2 below.
The allocation z =2 WE(R0), but we can now identify a sequence of
outcome fz; x; yg, as shown in the graph. When di¤erentiability is imposed,
the indi¤erence curves going through z under R1 and R01 have to be di¤erent
around zand inside the feasible setif z is no longer Walrasian at R0.
4 Taking care of the boundary problem
We now work with the domain RD in which preferences are continuous, con-
vex, strongly monotonic and representable by di¤erentiable utility functions.
9Obviously, even with this domain restriction, the Walrasian correspondence is not
Nash implementable since corner Walrasian allocations are not excluded.
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We construct a mechanism that doubly implements the Walrasian correspon-
dence in subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
The reason for constructing an alternative mechanism to the canonical
game form constructed in MR and AS is clear. It is of interest to investigate
the design of more tailor-made mechanisms. A simple and more economically
appealing mechanism that solves the boundary problem is absent from the
implementation literature.
The mechanism we construct has three stages. It involves price-allocation
announcements at the rst stage, and is thus more reminiscent of a market
process. Moreover, it ts closely the description of Walrasian Equilibrium.
First, remember that the Walrasian correspondence is implementable in Nash
equilibrium over a class of economies in which Walrasian allocations are al-
ways interior. It is appropriate to make the game stops at stage 1 if allo-
cations are in the interior of the feasible set.10 If, given a price p 2 P , an
interior allocation is not Walrasian, at least one agent would like to obtain
a di¤erent feasible bundle at that price. Moving along price hyperplanes
ts the Walrasian story: no one should prefer any other a¤ordable bundles.
This idea was already used, for instance, in Dutta-Sen-Vohra (1995) or Sot-
skov (2003). Given an interior allocation, the information contained locally
10Hence, if the domain of economies is such that Walrasian allocations are interior, in
equilibrium our mechanism never goes beyond the rst stage.
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in prices is enough to determine whether or not an allocation is Walrasian.
However, when the allocation is on the boundary of the feasible set, this
device does not work anymore. Moves along price hyperplanes can lead to
infeasible bundles.
Instead, we still rely on the information contained locally in prices, but
we use an idea of retrading. At the second stage of the mechanism, an agent
can propose a di¤erent price vector p0 to an agent j receiving xj  0. This
bundle xj plays the role of the new initial endowment for agent j. Thus p0
along with xj generates a new budget set for jhence the idea of retrading.
If an allocation x is Walrasian with price p, then a di¤erent price p0, with
this allocation x as new endowment point will automatically generates agents
who would like to retrade. On the other hand, if a boundary allocation is
not Walrasian and preferred bundles are infeasible, it is possible to propose
a di¤erent price vector such that at least one agentamong the agents who
receive strictly positive bundleswould not want to retrade. To understand
this, take a look at gure 3 above.
The allocation z 2 WE(R)nWE(R0). The price p0 6= p is such that
for every feasible bundles x1 6= z1 with p  x1 = p  !1, we have that
p0  x1 < p0  z1 . When agent 1 has preferences R1, there exists y1 such that
y1 P1 z

1 and p
0  y1 = p0  z1 . However, when agent 1 has preferences R01, such
a feasible y1 does not exist. This indicates that (z; p) is not Walrasian at
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R0. For if (z; p) was in fact a Walrasian equilibrium at R0, any p0 6= p such
that, for any feasible x1 6= z1 with p  x1 = p  !1 and p0  x1 < p0  z1 ; would
create protable retrading opportunities for agent 1.
The intuition developed with gure 3 is exactly what we use in our mech-
anism for allocations that are at the boundary of the feasible set.
We shall now present formally the mechanism we use.
Mechanism  :
Stage 1: mi = (x; p; )i 2 F  P   such that 8i 2 N , pi  xij = pi  !j
8j 6= i. If,
1) (x; p)i = (x; p) 8i 2 N and xi  0 8i 2 N , the game stops and the
outcome implemented is x.
2) (x; p)i = (x; p) 8i 2 N and xj;l = 0 for some j and l, then go to stage
2.
3) (x; p)j = (x; p) 8j 6= i, i 6= fn() and mi = (x0; p0) 6= (x; p).
If p  x0i = p  !i, then agent i gets x0i. Agent j = fn() gets the 0 bundle
and the other divide the rest equally. Otherwise if p  x0i 6= p  !i, each agent
k 2 N receives his endowment !k.
4) In all other cases, agent j = fn() receives !j   j. Each agent i 6=
ffn () ; f1()g receives !i and agent k = f1() receives !k + j.
Stage 2: Agent f1() selects an agent fi 6= f1() and announces p0 2 P .
1) if p0 6= p, xfi  0 and p0 is such that there exists feasible bundles
yfi 6= xfi, with p  yfi = p  !i and p0  yfi < p0  xfi. Go to stage 3.
2) In all other cases, the game stops and x is implemented.
Stage 3: Agent fi chooses between,
qfi 2 fqfi  !, qfi 6= xfi : p0  qfi = p0  xfi, p  qfi > p  xfig and xfi :
1) If he chooses xfi, he gets it. Agent f1() gets xf1() +
1
n 2(!   xfi  
xf1()). If agent fi 6= fn(), then agent fn() receives 0 and the other agents
j =2 ff1(); fi; fn()g divide the rest equally. Otherwise, if fi = fn(), then
agent fn 1() receives 0 and the other agents j =2 ff1(); fi; fn 1()g divide
the rest equally.
2) If he chooses qfi(), he gets it. Agent f1() gets 0 and the others divide
the rest equally if any.
We can now proceed to the main theorem of the paper.
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Theorem 1: Suppose the domain is RD and that n  3. Then, the
mechanism   doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in subgame
perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof: We rst show that SPE( ; R)  WE(R).11 That is, we pro-
ceed to show that if m is a subgame perfect equilibrium of ( ; R), then
g(m) 2 WE(R). In order to prove the assertion, consider a subgame perfect
equilibrium m, in which m1i = (x; p; )
i and g(m) = a. The proof is divided
in several lemma.
Lemma 1: (x; p)i = (x; p) 8i 2 N
Suppose not. We have two cases to consider.
Case 1 : (x; p)j = (x; p) 8j 6= i and i 6= fn().
First, if p  x0f1() = p  !f1(), agent fn() gets the 0 bundle. We can
construct a protable deviation for this agent. He deviates by appropriately
announcing a permutation so as to be rst in the protocol, and a di¤erent
price-allocation pair. A consequence of such a deviation is that he then
receives his endowment majored by a positive epsilon. Since !i > 0 and
preferences are strongly monotonic, this is a protable deviation for agent
fn(). A contradiction.
Second, if p  x0f1() 6= p  !f1(), then everyone receives his endowment.
But notice that any agent j 6= i, by modifying his permutation so as to be
rst in the protocol and announcing (x0; p0) 6= (x; p) could obtain !j + fn().
Since k > 0 for every k 2 N and preferences are strongly monotonic, this is
a protable deviation. A contradiction.
Case 2 : One agent i = fn() disagrees with the other about the price-
allocation pair, or more than one agent makes contradictory announcements
of a price and an allocation.
In such a case, agent i = fn() receives !i   i and each agent j =2
ff1(); fn()g receives !j. Any such agent j =2 ff1(); fn()g could deviate
by announcing a di¤erent permutation so as to be rst in the protocol
modifying his announcement of a price and allocation if necessaryand receive
!j+fn. Since k > 0 for each k 2 N and preferences are strongly monotonic,
this is a protable deviation for agent j, a contradiction.
Therefore, both cases lead to a contradiction with m being a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
11Since SSPE( ; R)  SPE( ; R); it is enough, for the rst part of the proof, to show
that SPE( ; R) WE(R).
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Lemma 2: If for each i 2 N , xi  0, then (x; p) is a Walrasian Equi-
librium
Suppose not. The game stops at stage 1. The allocation x, with xi  0
for each i 2 N , is the outcome of the game but is not Walrasian given the
price p.
By denition of a Walrasian equilibrium, convexity of preferences and the
fact that x is an interior allocation, there exists an agent i with preferences
say, Ri 2 Ri, and a feasible bundle x0i with p0  x0i = p0  !i, and such that
x0i Pi xi. Agent i can deviate at stage 1 by appropriately announcing a
permutation 0i 6= i so as to be, say, rst in the protocol, as well as (x0; p)
with x0i as identied above. In x
0, agent i assigns, say, x0j =
! x0i
n 1 to each
agent j 6= i. Agent i is awarded x0i, which is strictly preferred. This is a
protable deviation, a contradiction.
As a consequence, if x is an interior allocation, it is the outcome of the
game and it is Walrasian given p.
Lemma 3: If x is a boundary allocation, then it is the outcome of the
game
Suppose not. There exists an agent i 2 N for whom xi;l = 0 for some
l, and the game goes beyond stage 2. By the rules of the game, one agent
k 2 ff1(); fn(); fn 1()g receives the 0 bundle. Consider such an agent
k. Agent k modies his permutation, if necessary, so as to be rst in the
protocol. At stage 2, agent k announces p0 = p and whatever name in the
remaining protocol. The game stops with x as outcome.
Remember that for each agent j 2 N , !j > 0, p  xj = p  !j and p  0.
Thus, it is the case that xj > 0 for each agent j 2 N . Hence, by deviating,
agent k can obtain xk > 0. By strong monotonicity of preferences, this is a
protable deviation. A contradiction.
Lemma 4: If x is a boundary allocation, then (x; p) is a Walrasian
Equilibrium
Suppose not. x is the outcome of the game at stage 2 but (x; p) is not
Walrasian. We have two cases to consider.
1) x is the outcome of the game but there exists an agent i 2 N , with
preferences Ri 2 Ri, for whom
Bi(p; !i)jxi! \ SUCi(xi; Ri) 6= ;.
Agent i has a protable deviation. He deviates at the rst stage and modies
his permutation, if necessary, so as to be rst in the protocol. At stage 1, he
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announces (x0; p) with x0i 2Bi(p; !i)jxi!\SUCi(xi; Ri) such that px0i = p!i.
For each agent j 6= i, x0j = ! x
0
i
n 2 . In consequence, the game stops at stage 1
and agent i receives x0i which is strictly preferred to xi by construction. This
case is therefore not possible in equilibrium. The only case left is when there
exists an agent i 2 N , for whom Bi(p; !i)jxi! \ SUCi(xi; Ri) = ;.
2) x is the outcome of the game but there exists an agent i 2 N , with
preferences Ri 2 Ri, for whom
Bi(p; !i) \ SUCi(xi; Ri) 6= ;.
Since the previous case is ruled out, we have that if x0i 2 Bi(p; !i) \
SUCi(xi; Ri), then x0i;l > !l for some good l. Notice that for this agent i, xi 
0. Consider an agent j 6= i. Agent j has a protable deviation. He announces
a di¤erent permutation at stage 1, if necessary, so as to be rst in the protocol.
At stage 2, he announces p0 6= p such that Bi(p0; xi)jxi!\UCi(xi; Ri) = fxig,
 where Bi(p0; xi)jxi! = fxi  ! : p0  xi  p0  xig , and calls agent i. The
best response of agent i at stage 3 is to choose xi. Hence, agent j will be
awarded xj + 1n 2(!  xi  xj). Since xk > 0 for each k 2 N and preferences
are strongly monotonic, this is a protable deviation.
Thus, both cases lead to the construction of a protable deviation, a
contradiction with m being a subgame perfect equilibrium. This concludes
the rst part of the proof.
We have showed that every SPE outcome should be aWalrasian allocation
(on the boundary or inside the feasible set). To complete the proof, we prove
the opposite direction. That is, we prove that WE(R)  SSPE( ; R).
Suppose (x; p) is a Walrasian equilibrium and that the preference prole is
R = (Ri)i2N 2 R. Then the following strategies support x as SSPE outcome
of ( ; R).
(i) Every agent i announces (x; p; I)i, where I is the identity permu-
tation.
(ii) Let (p; x) be the unanimously agreed price-allocation pair and f()
the composition of permutations at stage 1.
Agent f1():
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a) If there exists an agent fi 6= f1() with preferences, say, Rfi 2 Rfi, and
xfi  0, such that Bfi(p; !fi)jxfi! \ SUCfi(xfi ; Rfi) = ; and there exists
x0fi 2 Bfi(p; !fi) \ SUCfi(xfi ; Rfi) with x0fi;l > !l for some l.
Agent f1() calls agent fi and announces an appropriate p0 (given the
rules of the game) such that xfi 2 Bfi(p0; xfi)jxfi! \ UCfi(xfi ; Rfi) and
Bfi(p
0; xfi)jxfi! \ SUCfi(xfi ; Rfi) = ;.
b) Otherwise, agent f1() announces p0 = p and calls agent f2().
(iii) Agent fi chooses the bundle she prefers between xfi and
qfi 2 fqfi  ! : p0  qfi = p0  xfi, p  qfi > p  !fig. If she is indi¤erent be-
tween xfi and any such qfi, then she announces xfi.
The optimality of part (iii) is clear. Agent fi chooses the bundle she
prefers. In case of indi¤erence, she agrees with agent f1().12 Now, notice
that agent f1() is playing a best response at stage 2. He announces p0 6= p
only if there exists an agent fi 6= f1() for whom xfi  0, Bfi(p; !fi)jxfi! \
SUCfi(xfi ; Rfi) = fxfig and there is a x0fi 2 Bfi(p; !fi)\SUCfi(xfi ; Rfi) with
x0fi;l > !l for some l. By doing so, agent f1() can obtain xf1() +
1
n 2(!  
xfi   xf1()) > xf1() (by appropriately choosing a price p0 6= p, and calling
agent fi). Whenever this condition is not satised, one of the best response
of agent f1() is to announce p0 = p and to call agent f2 (). Moreover, given
the rules of the game, they cannot be made both better o¤ at stage 3.
Finally, because every Walrasian allocation is individually rational for
each i 2 N , Bi(p; !i)\ SUCi(xi; Ri) = ;, the behavior in (i) is also optimal.
Any deviation by a coalition will result in the same outcome (if agents just
modify their permutation) or in an outcome that is weakly dominated by
any Walrasian allocations (obtaining individual endowments in which it is
not possible to make coalitions strictly better o¤). This prole of strategies
is a strong subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hence, on the equilibrium path, each agent i 2 N announces (x; p)i =
(x; p) a Walrasian equilibrium. If for each agent i; xi  0, then the game
stops at stage 1 and x is implemented. Otherwise, it goes to stage 2 where
agent f1() conrms the status-quo coming from stage 1. The game stops
and x is implemented.
Q.E.D.
12This situation could happen o¤ the equilibrium path.
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Remark 1 In the previous section, we underlined that the issue raised in
proposition 1 pertains to the Lindhal correspondence. An example of such a
mechanism is available upon request.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that, without di¤erentiability, the Walrasian correspondence
is not implementable in any solution concept. Imposing di¤erentiability
of preferences makes the Walrasian correspondence subgame perfect imple-
mentable. We constructed a sequential game form that takes care of the
boundary problem. It doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in
subgame perfect and strong subgame perfect equilibrium. It is thus robust
to coalitional deviations.
Our mechanism is based on price-allocation announcements and ts the
Walrasian story. Moves along price hyperplanes are at the heart of the Wal-
rasian equilibrium concept. Price-taking behavior is not an assumption but
a consequence of the rules of the game. In addition, the mechanism could
be modied so as to cover the case of the Lindhal correspondence. Our
mechanism is thus well-adapted to competitive concepts.
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